Bushfires Royal Commission Consultation Part 4

August 30th, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

It is part of the beauty of conversation, that in the process of the mixing and mulling, solutions are created that wouldn’t otherwise come to the surface. In one such moment in the consultations on the Royal Commission recommendations, we came up with a compassionate and fair compromise for the government land buy back proposal.

We started the discussion about the Royal Commission proposal for the government to buy back land in high-risk areas with me questioning the reference in the explanation to “townships”. I thought the Royal Commission recommendation was for a limited number of really high risk properties, with the common example being in deep forest at the top of a ridge. ‘Whole townships’ sounded to me like a bit of scaremongering. But I was convinced by the group that the issue was about the impact on townships and communities, even if only a small number of properties were reclaimed.

We had an animated discussion about the issue of who maintains the land acquired and the impact on remaining properties. One woman was deep in thought, deciding her position. She finally asked “Why? Why should the government buy the properties back? When people bought these properties they knew it was a high risk, its up to them to deal with it or move, it’s their lookout.”

My response to those arguments is the same one that underpins all my thinking about community bushfire issues. Yes, people ‘should’ do a whole lot of things to prepare for bushfire, but if they don’t, won’t or can’t, and we know that this happens, it affects all of us if they die, are injured or burnt out. We live in a community and we are all affected when others are.

There was a difference in opinion on this issue at our table, some like the woman above, were opposed in principle, some thought it was just too tricky and expensive and others thought that if it is thought through and has a clear set of rules, it was a good option.

We did come up with another variation on the option, which seemed to get general support at the table. We sympathised with the plight of the people who had been burnt-out in the 2009 fires. Many of them want to move on but can’t sell their land. They go through the enormous effort of rebuilding for the sole purpose of reselling. The toll on their families is huge when they are otherwise trying to come to terms with the tragedy in their lives.

So the compromise suggestion is that if you are burnt out in a bushfire you have the option of selling your land to the government. The government would then assess the situation and at some point decide whether to permanently acquire the land or resell it, allowing it to be re-developed.

Afterwards I thought it would probably be good to wait 3 or 6 months, as a cooling off period, so that people don’t sell as a kneejerk reaction to being burnt out. And I am sure there would need to be a host of other rules and regulations, but we all thought the idea had merit.

Since then the government has announced its response to the Royal commission and the buy back option is the only one rejected in total. Pity, we thought our compromise option had merit.

Mixed metaphors and muddy bushfire waters

August 26th, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

Victorian local councils have until the end of August to approve their Neighbourhood Safer Places Plan. Despite being named in the top 52 high risk areas in Victoria, Macedon and Mt Macedon were not nominated with a Neighbourhood Safer Place when Council passed its NSP Plan last night. In working through the process and attending the Council meeting, I am forced to take my own advice -sometimes or maybe all the time, you have to accept people the way they are, not they way (you think) they should be.

The Macedon/Mt Macedon Community Bushfire Group, which I am involved with, had met with Council Officers the week before the Council meeting. They advised us of the reasons Council did not feel able to nominate a Neighbourhood Safer Place in Macedon or Mt Macedon. They considered 12 locations but only 2 had met their criteria. These were then assessed by the CFA against the criteria for radiant heat and they failed, so no NSP.

We questioned them about the Tony Clarke stadium; the favoured choice for a NSP as it sits between the two townships, is a large building next to a large oval, and had previously met the CFA radiant heat criteria. We had been told the previous summer that Council would look at what was required to make Tony Clarke meet the Municipal Association of Victoria criteria and it wasn’t a matter of money.

The big issue with Tony Clarke, the Council officers said, is access – there is only one main road in. We talked for sometime about this and our group had some creative solutions. But it seemed as though as soon as we came up with a possible solution to one problem, the officers would raise another issue – like who would be there on the day or how can we make the building ember proof without compromising its ability to be a sports stadium? It became a circular argument with no way out.

The officers indicated that they were continuing their investigations into Tony Clarke. They had obtained an engineers report and were in the process of getting more expert reports, but at the moment it did not meet the Municipal Association Victoria criteria. I have no doubt the Officers are working hard and well intentioned.

But it seems to me there is a persistent and nagging resistance to neighbourhood safer places and fire refuges, which does not see our local government rushing to provide a life saving option for its residents.

Twenty years of stay or go is not going to be dissolved into stay, go early, or as a last resort take your chances in a community location. We all agree the safest option is to leave an area early every high-risk day. But the evidence is overwhelming that a high percentage of the population – over half- will not leave every high-risk day. About 10% of the community intend to stay and defend their property in any conditions. Those rest who stay on a high risk day fall into three main categories – stay until there is a fire in the area then leave, wait to be told what to do or wait until they see the fire and then decide.

We can say until we are blue in the face these people should have left, and they need education to make sure they understand that a NSP is a place of last resort. But it is equivalent to putting your head in the sand to think because this is what should happen, this is what will happen, and we should only plan for what should happen because to do anything else encourages what shouldn’t happen. (Head spinning?)

We need to make the solution fit the people not pretend we can make the people fit the solution. That did not work on Black Saturday and it will not work now.

But to take my own words and apply them in reverse, people – and governments are made up of people- need a long time to turn around such a deeply embedded belief system. Government risk aversion, the muddy waters of responsibility and self reliance and the human tendency to resist change, all contribute to the slow pace of engaging people in a new vision for how to live with bushfire. We seem to still be slowing the ‘stay or go’ beast down before we can change its direction or even its diet.

So for me too, the new way of thinking is about accepting that it will take time to change the old belief systems and that many will perhaps never change. But we are all motivated by a common desire to stop the destruction.

Bushfires Royal Commission Consultation Part 3

August 23rd, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

Refuges was our next topic and with great gusto and enthusiasm we found surprising and furious agreement as to how to provide community bushfire refuges.

It started when a hand came over the top of our table and removed the word “Evacuation” and delivered the word “Refuges”.  Perfect timing, I thought, my favourite topic, we were warmed up for discussion but not tired.  It turned out I wasn’t the only one on the table who liked talking about refuges.

On our table, in complete caped-crusader disguise, was John from the Department of Justice.  At this point he revealed himself as John Schauble from the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner, author of the recent discussion paper on fire refuges.  He tried completely unsuccessfully to stay out of the conversation, or perhaps he had given up all pretence by this stage.  It all added to the mix and we had an interesting discussion.

Others on our table might have a different recollection of our conversation, but I thought that after some animated discussion it was generally agreed that in any area it was preferable to have a number of smaller refuges, rather than one enormous one, that they needed to be well stocked and equipped, they needed to be managed by community and there needed to be some sort of structure in place on the day, in other words a nominated group of community members with roles and responsibilities.

After these two topics I tried to take a backseat, not only because the other topics aren’t my direct interest but to share the airspace (I don’t say I actually succeeded).  Next up was Powerlines.

We started with the general question -are underground or aerial bundled powerlines a good idea?.  While initially it was seen as a no brainer – of course they because so many bushfires are started by overhead powerlines – there was also a lot of support for the suggestion of the Alternative Technology Association in their recent press release.

They say – Why not address this issue as far as practicable, by installing SAPS (Stand Alone Power Supplies)?  In other words get people, particularly those living in isolated locations, off the grid.  It is a win/win for everyone – less long spans of powerlines so a reduced bushfire risk, less use of brown coal so less pollution and free power supply for those off the grid.  Small groups of houses could be supported to ‘collectivise’ their power supply and needs.

Outside this approach, the big issues with fixing the powerlines is the cost and the problem of who would pay.  Suprisongly in the  7 minutes we had left we didn’t come up with a magic solution to these issues.

Did you go to one of these sessions in your area?  What did you discuss?  How did you find it?  What ideas came out of your sessions?

Bushfires Royal Commission Consultation Part 2

August 17th, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

It was explained to us by the organisers, that the Premier wanted our views about 6 topics -  refuges, local government, evacuations, fuel reduction acquisitions and powerlines.  Every day the results from each meeting were being fed back to the Premier’s Office where they were being collated and the Premier was being updated.

There was a line of police against the wall, a few photographers and a variety of other officials from government agencies, all ‘observing’.  A little off-putting until we started talking, and then, for me anyway, they all but disappeared such was my passionate focus on the discussion.

Admittedly our first two topics were evacuation and refuges, both intimately connected with community response to bushfire and so favourites for me.  But in the end it didn’t matter what the topic, I really enjoyed sitting around a table talking with intelligent people from my community, all really interested in how we live with bushfire.

The government people initially did their best to stay out of the conversation, but like us, they also have views they want to express, and as long as it’s their mind not the government line, I don’t mind at all.

Besides, fire seems to do that to all of us, -create strong opinions- a bit like religion and politics.

Poor Sarah from DHS copped a bunch of withering looks when she suggested we should be thinking about all hazards evacuation not just bushfire.  Not surprising given her background in emergency recovery, and it just shows the strong influence of whatever ‘lense’ we are using.  As my ‘lense’ is community preparation and response, I was a less interested in powerlines than community refuges.

So we started with the topic of evacuation.  We were directed to Recommendation 5:

The State introduce a comprehensive approach to evacuation, so that this option is planned, considered and implemented when it is likely to offer a higher level of protection than other contingency options.  The approach should:

  • encourage individuals—especially vulnerable people—to relocate early
  • include consideration of plans for assisted evacuation of vulnerable people
  • recommend ‘emergency evacuation’.

We had trouble focussing because this recommendation and the question we were given were not very clear – there seemed to be a blurring of the concepts of leaving early with that of emergency evacuation.  We went back and forth for a while, looking at how to look after vulnerable people – the elderly and disabled, and how/when/who is involved in an emergency evacuation.

Eventually we decided the vital issue to talk about was: Should we have emergency evacuation?  After some discussion, we seemed to reach a general consensus that even though the (mythical?) people sitting in their lounge rooms on high risk days, watching TV with the curtains closed and the air conditioner on, were not helping themselves, the research showed that a large part of the population will wait to be told what to do by someone in authority.

We agreed that if emergency evacuation was going to increase the chance of saving a lot of lives, it should be done.  Really though I think it sounded like we were just saying “tell people when there is a fire coming and tell them to get out if they are not properly prepared to defend their home.  Be clear and direct about it.”

Clogged roads and how to move frail and elderly were all touched on and inevitably lead the conversation to the role of community bushfire refuges.

And as it happens, this was our next topic….

Bushfires Royal Commission Consultation Part 1

August 12th, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

This is the first of a couple of posts about the government’s community consultation on the Royal Commission Final report

Post One

It was going to be a big meeting, I knew that. Whether it is the history of Ash Wednesday or some other intangible quality in our community, but we talk about fire a lot around here.  I used to think it was just me, that somehow my fascination with how we live with bushfire meant I unconsciously turned every conversation to the topic of bushfire.

And I am sure this is partly true, but I definitely don’t get the same response when I want to talk about other topics I find fascinating.  With bushfire people are only too happy to pick up the thread and talk at length about it.  And I realised it wasn’t just me when I arrived late one day to my veggie gardening group and they were all talking about bushfire (they reckoned they had only just started and only because they knew I had arrived!).

I also knew the meeting was going to be big because I received 5 emails and 1 phone call about it.

So it was with some excitement and anticipation that I headed the down the road 10km to Woodend for the Victorian Premier’s Community Consultation Meeting about the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission’s Final Report.

As its name suggests, Woodend is on the edge of a forest.  While the town itself is not a ‘forest town’ like Macedon, the forest to the southwest of Woodend is huge  and lots of people who call Woodend home live in houses nestled in the bush.

The room was full and buzzing.  There were tables set out with maybe 8 chairs at each and the organisers had curiously set themselves up off centre, at the side of the hall (near the door for a quick exit?).   They were not where I expected them to be – up the front, near or on the stage.

I headed to a table with a few empty chairs and as my eyes focussed I realised I knew someone at the table.  It was Sarah, who works in emergency recovery for the Department of Human Services (DHS) and also lives in Woodend.   She explained that she and one of the others already at the table (from the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner), were from ‘the government’ to help us.    They had a huge pad of butchers’ paper and would note down our views.

On each table was a sheet with one of the topics written, a short explanation about the issues, a couple of questions and a reference to the specific recommendation of the report.  There were also several copies of the Summary of the final report.  As our table sheet said “Evacuation”  I quickly made to move as I wanted to talk about refuges.  Sarah just as quickly reassured me that we would get a chance to discuss all the topics.   I sat down.

Is the suspense killing you?

What happens next?   How long do you have to wait?

To be continued ……soon.

Online Index for Royal Commission Report

August 3rd, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

Tom Worthington has painstakingly gone through the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report and made a very handy online index for all the parts of the report.  To access go to Tom’s blog Net Traveller.

The Reclose Function on the SWER line

August 2nd, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

At the risk of adding to the cacophonous noise being generated around the release of the Royal Commission Final Report into the 2009 bushfires, I will put my two bobs worth in.

I am pleased, encouraged and heartened by what I have read and understood so far.  Perhaps it was a ploy, but my fears around the radical and angry tack taken by Counsel Assisting the Royal Commission are unfounded.  The recommendations, for the most part, align with my thinking so I am pretty pleased.  This is a first blush response.  I haven’t had time to appreciate the nuances and practical implications of some of them and I don’t have my ordered copy of the report to read the background.

I like Recommendation One:

“The State revise its bushfire safety policy. While adopting the national Prepare. Act. Survive. framework in

Victoria, the policy should do the following:

  • enhance the role of warnings—including providing for timely and informative advice about the predicted passage of a fire and the actions to be taken by people in areas potentially in its path
  • emphasise that all fires are different in ways that require an awareness of fire conditions, local circumstances and personal capacity
  • recognise that the heightened risk on the worst days demands a different response
  • retain those elements of the existing bushfire policy that have proved effective
  • strengthen the range of options available in the face of fire, including community refuges, bushfire shelters and evacuation
  • ensure that local solutions are tailored and known to communities through local bushfire planning
  • improve advice on the nature of fire and house defendability, taking account of broader landscape risks.

It strikes me as a good précis of the critical issues in relation to community needs and understanding of bushfire.

I am not as inspired by Recommendation Two:

The State revise the approach to community bushfire safety education in order to:

  • ensure that its publications and educational materials reflect the revised bushfire safety policy
  • equip all fire agency personnel with the information needed to effectively communicate the policy to the public as required
  • ensure that in content and delivery the program is flexible enough to engage individuals, households and communities and to accommodate their needs and circumstances
  • regularly evaluate the effectiveness of community education programs and amend them as necessary.

While I find this lacking in substance and drive, I am pleased with its position as number 2, if this reflects its importance.  But it is bland and empty and I reckon the government and its agencies would say they do all of the things listed already.  On the face of it, it doesn’t call for radical change, indeed any change, or any increase in resources towards community education.

And yet we know and there seems to be an acknowledgement underpinning the Report, that community empowerment and responsibility is crucial to increasing our ability to live with bushfire risk.  To do this you need a radical rethink about how government engages with community and I don’t get the feeling this is what is envisaged in the Report.  The ‘what’ is there but not much of the ‘how’.  Another example is the area of local bushfire planning where the Recommendation is silent on ‘how’ it is done, yet how it is done will have a huge impact whether it is adopted and owned by a community.

But in more technical areas the ‘how’ is very much laid out.  For example Recommendation 32:

The State (through Energy Safe Victoria) require distribution businesses to do the following:

  • disable the reclose function on the automatic circuit reclosers on all SWER lines for the six weeks of greatest risk in every fire season
  • adjust the reclose function on the automatic circuit reclosers on all 22-kilovolt feeders on all total fire ban days to permit only one reclose attempt before lockout.

These are very specific technical ‘how to’ instructions.

But then a reclose function on a SWER line is a much easier thing to manage and understand than a community facing a bushfire.

Did you hear about…..

July 19th, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

On the 25th June the Victorian Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner (OESC) issued a media release advising that the Fire Refuges Discussion paper was released and inviting community submissions by the 30 July.

One media outlet picked up the story – Ballarat Regional ABC Radio.  Three weeks later the CFA Connect site advised the CFA community about the opportunity.

Other than that, the OESC has made no effort to promote, advise or inform the community of this paper or that it is seeking input from them about this issue, which is so close to the heart of community bushfire safety.  The OESC explains that this is because of the tight timelines imposed by the Royal Commission.

But I would argue that a tight time frame is all the more reason to ensure that as much of the community know about and have the opportunity to contribute to the process as a possible.  They allowed five weeks for community input but it took three weeks for there to be anything more than one mention on a regional radio station.   It is incumbent on the OESC to monitor if the issue is promoted by the media and take other steps if it isn’t.

The discussion paper lists the stakeholders the OESC has worked with to develop the policy. Apart from the Municipal Association of Victoria, they have all been state government departments, and the MAV represents another arm of government.    No community groups have been invited to the table to contribute, discuss or represent the views of community.  This may be difficult because there is no umbrella group at the moment, but there are some groups who could be invited or at the very least notified.  (The lack of such a group representative of community views is in itself an issue the Office of Emergency Services Commissioner might set about addressing.)

It all smacks of government talking about and deciding for community, not with community.  It is this type of government decision making which encourages us to wait for someone in authority to tell us what to do when a fire is bearing down upon us, afterall they have made all the decisions for us so far.

Presumably the OESC had umpteen weeks before they released the paper, to plan how they were going to ensure as many people as possible were informed.  They could have targeted the well-known at-risk communities.  They could have explained that there were tight timelines, so the consultation isn’t as wide as they would like, but can communities spread the word?  They could have done en email campaign, or targeted community groups in high-risk areas.

Any of these efforts would have at least given the notion that there is a commitment to the much-lauded concept of community/government partnership around bushfire risk.  Such effort, or lack of it, goes to other issues like respect, trust and collaboration.

Changes to the Victorian Fire Refuges policy is arguably one of the most significant changes to Victoria’s bushfire policy, in a time of great change.  Fire refuges are so deeply embedded in community response and need, that every effort must be made to engage, consult and inform the community and truly listen to what they have to contribute.

And how important consultation and engagement are for community preparedness, response, and recovery from bushfires, is a topic for another post.

10/30 – bushfire purpose or free for all?

July 6th, 2010 by Kate Lawrence
Shire ‘backsliding’ on bushfire policy

The Sunday Age

MICHAEL BACHELARD

July 4, 2010

A COUNCIL in one of the state’s most bushfire-prone areas is already backsliding on fire-prevention policies, launching a legal bid to try to hinder residents’ ability to clear trees on their property, a resident says.

Nillumbik Shire Council took resident Daniel Potter to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in April after he cut down a eucalypt on his block that he thought was a fire hazard. He was allowed to do so under the ”10/30” rule, introduced by the state government last year to allow residents in fire-prone areas to clear trees and shrubs around their houses without a permit. Read more.

I must admit I was surprised when I read about Nillumbik taking this case to VCAT.  I thought it was a brave action in the current climate, where you can be almost blamed for future deaths or house losses if you suggest that not all gum trees near houses or on roadsides be cut down.  And indeed hear is the comment from Jim Child:

Give the Shire of Yarra Ranges half a chance they would have done the same!

“They basically attempted to hijack this policy and put a legitimacy test on everyone who cut a tree down.”

I ask what exactly is wrong with a legitimacy test?  We live in the bush because it is exactly that, the bush, with trees and birds and wildlife and all the other things we love.  I don’t want to live in a dust bowl devoid of vegetation and wildlife, I don’t want to wreak havoc on the waterways from soil erosion, or contribute to species extinction or any one of the many other environmental impacts of tree removal.   It is a matter of balance and that is exactly what a legitimacy test does, provide some balance from knee jerk reaction or blatant opportunism.

Yes we need to prepare and be mindful of fire risk and this may entail cutting down trees.  But some of the things which contribute more to fire intensity and house loss than trees, and which we can put our time and energy into are: leaf and bark litter from the trees, weeds – broome, blackberries, heath, and the vegetation in the home garden.

I am more supportive of this comment from Elaine Hartley posted on the Dandenong Ranges Community Bushfire Group yahoo group:

“So mindless hysteria and the need for over-simplified certainty triumphs over a sense of place and more situated local knowledge. We saw last year that many people did not interpret the 10/30 rule with understanding and some regrettable and quite senseless incidences of clearing occurred  noticeably on school grounds.  No valid assessments of the potential impact of this 10/30 rule in different environments have taken place- can we even predict whether it will save or exacerbate fire losses? Numerous fire studies suggest that fire slows as it moves through wind-resistant dense forest and flares up as it encounters roadside breaks and small clearings. Why are the experts in fire behaviour so silent?  Why are our institutions failing to provide intelligent leadership?  Elaine”

Speculation

July 3rd, 2010 by Kate Lawrence

My interest in bushfires is in how community learn about and respond to bushfires.  In November last year I went to a day of hearings of the Royal Commission into the Black Saturday bushfires.  It was a day they were looking at some of the deaths that occurred at Marysville.  I had been waiting to see the analysis of how people died on Black Saturday.  The fact that 113 of the 173 bodies were found in houses has turned upside down previous research and analysis, which showed that most people died in the open.

The commission is on the 11th floor of an ordinary office building at 222 Exhibition Street.  I walk through a security process and into a large carpeted foyer with a number of rooms off the sides.   While I am quite familiar with a courtroom, there seems to be liberties and changes to some protocols with this Royal Commission, so I am nervous and at pains not to blunder where no one else is blundering.

I am stopped by the only other person in the large foyer “What is your interest in the Commission?” I explain I am just a member of the public.  The woman kindly explains that the commission deals with each set of circumstances in hourly blocks, each hour being an hour apart from the last session.  The first one was at 9.30 am and the next one will be at 11.30am. It is 10.45.  She indicates vaguely around the corner saying that is where the hearings take place and I clumsily ask “What are the people in that room doing?” “They are the family.” she replies.

I decide to wait in the foyer.  It becomes clear that my assistant and another woman are social workers or grief counsellors tending to the family members.  This in itself is an anomaly; Courts have traditionally concerned themselves exclusively with the pursuit of truth not human emotions such as grief.

It is delicate, there are hugs and strength, you can almost see the gaps, the family is not whole – someone, or two or three members are missing.

While I am waiting I notice the artwork on the wall.  There is an explanation stating that this is the second of three planned exhibitions initiated by the Commission.  The fires have affected all the artists in one way or another.  Again this is huge deviation from traditional action and role of Courts and Royal Commissions.  This is about examining and healing from the fires on an emotional level, not a strict examination of the circumstances.

Artwork, counselling, grieving, acknowledging the pain, are all vitally important, and I think can sit with investigation and inquiry, but I don’t think this is what has happened here.  I think the Royal Commission, the team assisting them and much of the media has been unable and indeed unwilling to distance themselves from the pain and grieving.

That day I attended the Commission, I heard two hearings examining the circumstances of deaths, one of a couple who were camping at a river in Marysville, and the other of a man who died defending his holiday home in Marysville.

The couple were in their early 50’s, from the City and their bodies were found in a burnt out car half way between Marysville and the Taggerty River.   The hearing starts with an overview of the fire that burned through Marysville and some video footage of where the bodies were found.

There is evidence of a conversation two days before the camping trip where a friend is trying to dissuade the man from going on the trip because it was going to be so hot.  There is evidence of a call between the woman and her daughter at 6.30pm on Saturday, 15 minutes before the fire hits Marysville.  The woman says there are helicopters in the area; she believes they are looking for spot fires.  The couple’s car is found the following day about 3 – 4 km from Marysville, facing away from the township.    There are fallen trees all around the vehicle.  There is evidence of a gouge in the road, which the police deduce indicates the car made a hasty u-turn to escape the fire in front of them.

The evidence is lead by Counsel Assisting the Commission, Mr Rozens.  While there are other counsel representing various parties present they all choose not to ask any questions.  The commissioners however ask a few.

Chairman Commissioner Teague refers to a comment made in the statement made by the man’s friend that at some distant time on another camping trip there was a discussion about sheltering in a river if there was a bushfire.  The chairman then says:

“….it seemed to me that that may have been part of the thinking in turning away from the town. It may well have been blocked, but the aim would be to get back to the river.  Again, we are speculating perhaps more than drawing a reasonable inference,….”

Commissioner MacLeod then also suggests that they may have decided that Marysville was going to be heavily impacted and so they chose to head to the Taggerty River.

All of this is not only speculation it goes against the weight of evidence.  There is a phone call 15 minutes before the fire hit Marysville where the couple were just about to have tea and had no inkling of fire except to say that the helicopters were putting out spot fires.  To then suggest they assessed Marysville as being seriously impacted and so they made plans to leave the river they were at, and head to a different river is to create fanciful set of possible decisions.   Such speculation lead by the Commission itself starts to give me an inkling of the lengths the Commission is willing to go to give all victims the benefit of any doubt about their wisdom and decisions making in the face of the fire.  It is an attitude that colours much of the analysis and discussion within the commission of how people died and the choices and decisions they made.

I will examine more of the Commission’s work in coming posts.